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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, sixty-year-old Karlene Willemson, an Oregon resident, died after a 
fire broke out in her home.1 Willemsen had multiple sclerosis and was confined 
to a wheelchair.2 In bed and unable to move, Willemsen was powerless to save 
herself from the smoke and flames.3 
A year after her death, Willemsen’s family filed a products liability suit in 
Oregon against several corporations, including Invacare Corporation, a motorized 
wheelchair manufacturer based in Ohio, and China Terminal and Electric 
Corporation (CTE), a Taiwanese corporation that supplies battery chargers to 
Invacare.4 Willemsen’s family alleged that a defective battery charger 
manufactured by CTE started the fire5 and that, based on medical evidence, 
Willemsen “was alive and conscious at the time of the fire and that she suffered 
significant pre-death burns, physical injury and psychological terror.”6 CTE 
moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that the Oregon court lacked personal 
jurisdiction.7 The trial court denied the motion, and the Oregon Supreme Court 
denied CTE’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate 
its ruling.8 
With no luck in the state courts, CTE filed a petition for certiorari with the 
United States Supreme Court.9 CTE’s petition came at a somewhat pivotal time 
for the Court, as it was considering an important personal jurisdiction case that 
would be applicable to CTE and other foreign corporations,10 J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.11 The Court ultimately vacated the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision and remanded the case for “further consideration in light of 
Nicastro.”12 
 
1. Stuart Tomlinson, Family Files Lawsuit in Portland Woman’s Death, THE OREGONIAN (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/1233714309218400.xml&coll=7 (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 867–69 (Or. 2012). 
5. Id. at 869. 
6. Tomlinson, supra note 1. 
7. Willemsen, 282 P.3d at 869. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 869–70. 
11. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
12. Willemsen, 282 P.3d at 869–870. 
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But Nicastro was an ambiguous decision by a plurality of the Court giving 
the Oregon court little guidance.13 The plurality opinion limits state courts’ power 
over foreign defendants based upon a stream-of-commerce theory.14  The stream- 
of-commerce “refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers through 
distributors to consumers . . . .”15  This movement of goods from a manufacturer 
to consumers in various states can, theoretically, establish personal jurisdiction 
over the manufacturer where injury occurs in a state because of a product 
defect.16  Unfortunately, in Nicastro, a divided Court issued no clear guidance or 
test for how to determine liability based on the stream of commerce; as a result, 
lower courts are left to their own devices when they have foreign defendants 
whose only link to the state in which the court sits is the indirect import and sale 
of products.17 
While the Oregon Supreme Court applied Nicastro on its narrowest grounds 
(which is found in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion) and held that the Oregon 
courts did have personal jurisdiction over CTE based upon the volume of sales 
within the forum,18 this approach is not universal.19 This Comment demonstrates 
the considerable confusion in the wake of Nicastro and argues that the Supreme 
Court should articulate a clear stream-of-commerce test: specifically, that 
minimum contacts can be satisfied with a showing of sufficient volume of goods 
entering the forum through the stream. Sufficient volume should be further 
defined as a “regular course of sales”20 in the forum. Because this test would still 
leave open the possibility that some foreign corporations could escape liability 
because of lack of personal jurisdiction, this Comment further argues that a 
statutory solution that creates an alternative means of holding such foreign 
companies liable is necessary. 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of Nicastro and its application 
in the lower courts. Part III proposes a judicial solution for the stream-of-
commerce theory. Part IV discusses pending legislation that could provide a 
statutory solution for corporations that would otherwise not be subject to 
jurisdiction in any court in the United States. Part V concludes that judicial 
clarification of the stream-of-commerce theory, as well as a statutory fallback, is 
 
13. See generally J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
14. Id. at 2785. 
15. Id. at 2788. 
16. Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG. 239, 241 (1987). 
17. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The plurality seems to state strict rules that 
limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be 
said to have targeted the forum.’ But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by 
selling products from its Web site?”) (alterations in original). 
18. Willemsen, 282 P.3d. at 873–875; see also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–94. 
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Hamilton, No. 3 Civ. 609, 2012 WL 893748 at *2–3 (W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2012) 
(stating that Nicastro is limited in its applicability and that, in the case in question, the court will continue to 
follow Fifth Circuit precedents). 
20. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
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required to ensure that no corporation sending products to the United States is 
judgment-proof in United States courts. 
II. LOWER COURTS AND J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO: 
A DIVIDED RESPONSE 
This Part discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and its analysis and application in the lower courts.21 
Section A provides the backdrop to and an overview of Nicastro, looking 
individually at Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. Part B examines how lower 
courts have applied Nicastro in various cases. 
A. Stream of Commerce and Personal Jurisdiction: Unclear Directives from the 
Supreme Court 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, legal scholars believed that the Court would finally clarify a test for the 
stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction.22 The stream-of-commerce 
confusion began in 1987 with Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California.23 In Asahi, Justices O’Connor and Brennan, in dicta, articulated 
different standards for the stream of commerce.24 Justice O’Connor, writing for 
the plurality, believed personal jurisdiction turned on whether the defendant’s 
actions were purposefully directed at the state.25 She wanted something more than 
mere awareness that the corporation’s products may end up in the forum—for 
example, solicitation of business, hands-on involvement with the distribution 
network, or doing direct business within the state.26 Simply placing an item in the 
stream of commerce, by itself, is not enough.27 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that foreseeability was the 
driving factor, specifically that “[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware 
 
21. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
22. See, e.g., Kendall Gray, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro: Declarifying Asahi, The Appellate 
Record (June 28, 2011), http://www.appellaterecord.com/2011/06/articles/new-opinions/j-mcintyre-machinery-
v-nicastro-declarifying-asahi/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“. . . . Professors and law nerds 
everywhere had the vapors because the Supreme Court of the United States had a chance to clear it all up in J. 
McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.”). 
23. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
24. Id. at 114 (holding that jurisdiction over Asahi, a foreign corporation, would be unreasonable, “even 
apart from the question of the placement of goods in the stream of commerce”). 
25. Id. at 112 (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product 
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.”). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a 
lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”28 In his view, the defendant corporation 
benefitted directly from the sale of goods in the forum and indirectly from the 
laws that facilitated that sale, and those benefits make jurisdiction in these cases 
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Justice 
Brennan drew a line, based upon past precedents, between a situation where a 
customer transports a product into a forum and one where a product regularly 
reaches a forum through a distribution chain.30 The latter, he argued, creates 
sufficient contacts, while the former does not.31 
Finally, Justice Stevens, in a second concurring opinion, also addressed the 
stream of commerce.32 Taking issue with the “unwavering line” drawn by Justice 
O’Connor, Justice Stevens argued that the court should consider the volume, 
value, and hazard of goods entering the forum state through the stream of 
commerce in determining whether “this conduct rises to the level of purposeful 
availment” making assertion of personal jurisdiction constitutional.33 
Without a majority supporting either standard, it fell to lower courts to 
attempt to make some sense out of the differing opinions of the Justices in 
Asahi.34 The conflicting opinions in the case resulted in split circuits, confused 
opinions, and a variety of holdings with cases involving the stream of 
commerce.35 
Then came Nicastro, a 2011 products liability case with an American 
plaintiff and a foreign corporate defendant.36 The plaintiff, Robert Nicastro, was 
operating a metal-shearing machine manufactured by the defendant, a British 
corporation, when he seriously injured his hand.37 It appeared from the record that 
J. McIntyre had little contact with the forum state of New Jersey.38 J. McIntyre’s 
 
28. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 118–20 (comparing World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), where the 
plaintiff unilaterally transported the product into the forum with Gray v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 76 (1961), where jurisdiction was proper because the defendant sold component 
parts to a manufacturer who “incorporated them into a final product that was sold in Illinois.”). 
31. Id. at 117 (“As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in 
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit cannot come as a surprise.”). 
32. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 122. 
34. Gray, supra note 22. 
35. See Levi McAllister, Comment, Paddling the Stream of Commerce: The Supreme Court’s Need to 
Cautiously Re-Examine One Aspect of Personal Jurisdiction, and the Judicial and Financial Consequences 
Resulting from Current Approaches 3 HIGH CT. Q. REV. 53, 57–58 (2007) (describing circuit splits, including 
the First Circuit adoption of the O’Connor stream-of-commerce approach and the Eighth Circuit adoption of the 
Brennan approach). 
36. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. The record, although under-developed, included some contacts, including a US distributor, 
attendance by J. McIntyre officials at annual conventions, and one to four (the record is unclear) machines sold 
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sales were primarily to a US distributor, not to individual buyers.39 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the plurality, stated, “The question here is whether the New 
Jersey courts have jurisdiction over J. McIntyre, notwithstanding the fact that the 
company at no time either marketed goods in the State or shipped them there.”40 
It looked as though the Court was finally going to clear up the confusion that 
resulted from the dueling O’Connor and Brennan stream-of-commerce opinions 
in Asahi.41 
It was not to be. The Court once again divided over when personal 
jurisdiction is proper under the stream-of-commerce theory.42 In the plurality 
opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized state sovereignty, explaining “it is the 
defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”43 Justice Kennedy 
described a number of ways in which a defendant could “submit to a State’s 
authority . . . ”44 and stated that the principle inquiry is “whether the defendant’s 
activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”45 While 
Justice Kennedy discussed both the O’Connor plurality and Brennan concurrence 
from Asahi, he drew a stricter line than Justice O’Connor.46 Justice O’Connor 
looked for placement in the stream of commerce plus an additional act 
“purposefully directed toward the forum state.”47 Justice Kennedy’s call for 
“activities that manifest intention to submit to the power of a sovereign” seems to 
harken back to the pre-International Shoe days,48 where the now debunked 
implied-consent theory of personal jurisdiction was utilized by “[c]ourts and 
legislatures . . . to bring intuitively reasonable assertions of in personam 
 
in the forum. Id.  
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. Some commentators speculate that Justice Stevens’ retirement was key to the Court once again 
taking up personal jurisdiction. See Rodger D. Citron, The Case of the Retired Justice: How Would Justice John 
Paul Stevens Have Voted in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro?, 63 S.C. L. REV 643, 644 (2012) 
(discussing the fact that Justice Stevens could have created a majority in Asahi by casting his vote with either 
Justice O’Connor or Justice Brennan; however, Justice Stevens denied both sides his vote and wrote his own 
concurring opinion). “After he retired in 2010 and was replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court apparently 
saw an opportunity to resolve the conflict between the competing approaches set out by Justices O’Connor and 
Brennan and granted certiorari in McIntyre. Although Stevens had departed, the Court nevertheless was unable 
to establish the legal standard for stream of commerce jurisdiction.” Id. 
42. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (stating that four justices supported the plurality opinion, two 
supported the concurring opinion, and three supported the dissenting opinion). 
43. Id. at 2787. 
44. Id. at 2787–88. 
45. Id. at 2788. 
46. Id. 
47. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
48. See Dayton, supra note 16, at 247 (“Before 1945, in deference to due process, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had consistently held that a court could not assert nonconsensual personal jurisdiction over a person or 
thing that was not physically present within its jurisdiction.”). 
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jurisdiction within its parameters.”49 While Justice O’Connor looked for 
something more than just placement in the stream, Justice Kennedy appears to 
require stringent analysis of whether a person or corporation intended governance 
by the laws of the state in question.50 
Joined by Justice Alito, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but not in 
the reasoning.51 He rejected both the “plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction 
rule” and a mere awareness standard, articulated by Justice Brennan in Asahi and 
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.52 Justice Breyer stated that “the 
relevant facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court show no ‘regular . . . 
flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey; and there is no ‘something 
more,’ such as special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or 
anything else.”53 He observed that the plurality made the correct decision based 
on the record, which included only: (1) the sale of a single machine in New 
Jersey, (2) J. McIntyre’s intent to sell its machines to anyone in the United States 
through its distributor, and (3) attendance at trade shows in several cities outside 
of New Jersey.54 Furthermore, because the case did not implicate modern 
concerns, such as Internet sales, and because the record regarding J. McIntyre’s 
contacts with New Jersey was sparse, Justice Breyer declined any opportunity to 
make changes to jurisdictional rules.55 
Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in 
dissent, argued that J. McIntyre intended to target the United States as a single 
market, and that “by engaging McIntyre America [its US distributor] to promote 
and sell its machines in the United States,” it purposefully availed itself to any 
forum where products were sold by its distributor.56 
This is the legal landscape now facing lower courts. They must analyze these 
conflicting opinions to determine when, if at all, a stream-of-commerce theory is 
proper in subjecting a foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction. Rather than 
 
49. Id. at 248. “State courts and legislatures in the post-Pennoyer, pre-International Shoe era used the 
consent theory as a means of circumventing the limitations of the territorial approach related to physical 
presence.” Id. at 247 n.27. 
50. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
51. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I do not doubt that there have been many recent 
changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case 
does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full 
consideration of the modern-day consequences.”). 
52. Id. at 2793. The New Jersey Supreme Court premised jurisdiction on whether the defendant “knows 
or should know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to 
those products being sold in any of the fifty states,” which is similar to Justice Brennan’s opinion in Asahi, 
where he states that if a defendant is aware that a product is being marketed in the forum, “the possibility of a 
lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id.; Asahi v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
53. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
54. Id. at 2791. 
55. Id. at 2792–93. 
56. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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clarifying Asahi, as many had hoped, Nicastro continues the trend of confusion 
and inconsistent rulings.57 
B. Handling Nicastro: How Lower Courts Are Managing 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nicastro in mid-2011, nearly 200 
different opinions from various courts have cited to it.58  Thus far, lower courts 
are applying Nicastro inconsistently.59 This Section discusses the various 
approaches in greater detail.60 
1. Limiting Nicastro to Its Facts 
A number of courts, including the Oregon Supreme Court in Willemsen, 
relied on Justice Breyer’s concurrence as the narrowest grounds of agreement 
between a majority of the justices.61 Some courts have taken this further and held 
that Justice Breyer’s concurrence is limited to the same or similar sets of facts.62 
For example, in Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc.,63 plaintiffs brought suit on 
behalf of a relative, a citizen of Mississippi, who was struck and killed by a 
forklift manufactured by Moffett Engineering, an Irish corporation that sold its 
products through a US distributor.64 The court distinguished Nicastro on its 
facts—evidence showed the distributor had sold 203 Moffett machines in 
Mississippi totaling 1.55% of Moffett’s US sales at the time, while Nicastro dealt 
with one, single machine being sold in New Jersey—and declined to depart from 
the Fifth Circuit precedent of “mere foreseeability.”65  
 
57. Gray, supra note 22. 
58. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro Citing References, WESTLAWNEXT, https://1.next.westlaw. 
com/RelatedInformation/I61c0ed8aa0c511e0a5bbc8ef87b8b429/CitingReferences.html?originationContext=do
cumentTab&transitionType=CitingReferences&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&docSource=7702fa75a
3d6416282b79abd5b9f515b (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
59. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1–3 (describing the various lower court approaches to the stream-of-
commerce theory following the Nicastro decision). 
60. In an attempt to streamline the various opinions that have emerged since Nicastro was decided, I have 
selected four opinions that demonstrate the inconsistent ways lower courts are interpreting Nicastro.  
61. See, e.g., Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 873 (Or. 2012) (stating that Justice Breyer’s 
opinion is the narrowest grounds on which a majority concurred and, therefore, would guide its resolution of the 
present case). 
62. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2 Civ. 236 (S.D. Ms. Dec. 15, 2011) (“In the present 
matter, this Court concluded that Justice Breyer’s McIntyre opinion was only applicable to cases presenting the 
same factual scenario as that case.”). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at *1. 
65. Id. at *2. 
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2. Nicastro Limited Overall Because of Justice Breyer’s Indecision 
Prior to Nicastro, Fifth Circuit precedent called for following Justice 
Brennan’s foreseeability approach discussed in Asahi.66 Under this approach, a 
defendant need not have purposefully directed any activities at the forum state; 
rather, a defendant corporation simply must be able to foresee being haled into 
court because “it purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum state.”67 
Simply put, if a corporation knows its products are entering a state and the 
corporation benefits from sales of those products within that state, this would 
likely be enough to satisfy the foreseeability standard. 
A Louisiana district court considered whether Nicastro had changed existing 
Fifth Circuit precedent in Graham v. Hamilton.68 In Graham, the plaintiffs sued 
GM Canada following the malfunction of a vehicle that the corporation 
manufactured.69 A woman and her two children died after a wreck involving the 
vehicle in Louisiana, the forum state.70 GM Canada argued that personal 
jurisdiction was not proper because “[it] did not target Louisiana,” essentially a 
purposeful availment, not foreseeability, argument.71 In considering Nicastro, the 
court stated that, while Justice Breyer’s concurrence is binding, he declined to 
adopt a new rule.72 “As Justice Breyer declined to choose between the Asahi 
plurality opinions, [Nicastro] is rather limited in its applicability. It does not 
provide the Court with grounds to depart from the Fifth Circuit precedent.”73 The 
court, in applying that precedent, held personal jurisdiction to be proper.74 
3. Adhering to the Kennedy Approach 
Although Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro did not command a majority 
of the justices,75 some lower courts have adhered to his suggested analysis.76  In 
Keranos, LLC. v. Analog Devices, Inc.,77 a patent infringement suit, the district 
 
66. Graham v. Hamilton, 2012 WL 893748, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2012) (“In the Fifth Circuit, a 
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state when a defendant ‘knowingly benefits from the 
availability of a particular state’s market for its products . . . .’”). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at *1. 
70. Id.  
71. Id. at *2. 
72. Id. at *3. 
73. Id. (quoting Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., Civ. 236, at *19 (S.D. Ms. Dec. 15, 2011)). 
74. Id. at *5. 
75. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
76. See, e.g., Keranos, LLC. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 2011 WL 4027427 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011) at 
*10 (quoting from Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in the proper test for determining whether the defendant 
in question is subject to personal jurisdiction). 
77. Id. at *1. 
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court in Texas held that the plaintiff was entitled to jurisdictional discovery to 
determine whether jurisdiction would be proper “[i]n light of the new minimum 
contacts analysis announced in [Nicastro]. . . .”78 In discussing the legal standard 
established by Nicastro, the court articulated the test as Justice Kennedy’s 
analysis in his plurality opinion: specifically, “whether a defendant has followed 
a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the 
jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject 
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”79 The court did not mention 
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion.80 
4. A Fourth Approach: Examining the Volume of Goods Entering the 
Forum 
Some courts read Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion as inviting analysis on 
the volume of sales that have taken place within the forum state to determine 
whether personal jurisdiction would be proper.81 The Oregon Supreme Court took 
that approach in the Willemsen case, which is described in the introduction to this 
Comment.82 The court found that Invacare, the company that sold the wheelchair 
in question, sold more than 1,100 wheelchairs equipped with the batteries that 
CTE, the foreign defendant, made in Oregon over a two-year period.83 Based on 
this number, the court determined that a “‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of 
sales in Oregon” existed and that “[t]he sale of the CTE battery charger in 
Oregon that led to the death of plaintiffs’ mother was not an isolated or fortuitous 
occurrence.”84 Because of that, the court held that the trial court could properly 
exercise jurisdiction over CTE.85 Of the four approaches discussed, it is this  
case-by-case analysis of the volume of goods that have entered the forum that is 
closest to what Nicastro stands for and the analysis this Comment endorses. 
III. KEEPING THE FLOW: A JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION FOR THE  
STREAM OF COMMERCE 
This Part will discuss in greater detail why a stream-of-commerce theory of 
personal jurisdiction is necessary. It will also address some of the larger issues 
Nicastro presents, including inconsistencies with existing law and what the likely 
 
78. Id. at *10. 
79. Id. (quoting J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011)).  
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 874 (Or. 2012) (scrutinizing the number of 




85. Id. at 877. 
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outcome would be should courts continue to adopt the rigid analysis proposed by 
Justice Kennedy. Finally, this Part argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
articulate a clear test for when personal jurisdiction is proper under the stream-of-
commerce theory, and that the test should be a case-by-case analysis of the 
volume of goods entering or that have entered the forum state. 
A. Necessity of the Stream 
The Willemsen case is a prime example of why it is necessary to develop and 
maintain a viable test for determining personal jurisdiction under the stream-of-
commerce theory.86 CTE, which manufactured the allegedly defective battery, is 
a Taiwanese corporation that elected to do business in the United States via an 
Ohio-based company.87 The record does not contain any evidence that CTE 
elected to sell its batteries in Oregon, or to advertise in Oregon, or to engage in 
any kind of conduct within Oregon whatsoever.88 Rather, CTE merely passed an 
allegedly defective battery through a distribution chain—perhaps with the belief 
that this hands-off approach would insulate the corporation from liability, at least 
in this case.89 
Without the stream of commerce, CTE would have likely been correct in 
arguing that jurisdiction was not proper. Based on the record, it had no contacts 
with Oregon,90 which means the minimum contacts prong of a personal 
jurisdiction analysis would not be satisfied,91 which makes the likelihood of 
subjecting CTE to the jurisdiction of Oregon courts improbable.92 This means that 
CTE, because it elected to distribute its products through a US company, rather 
than directly, would essentially be judgment-proof. If CTE was not subject to the 
power of US courts, the plaintiff’s only option would be to sue in Taiwan, where 
CTE is based.  Due to distance and cost, this is overly burdensome on an injured 
plaintiff. Ultimately, the corporation likely would not be held accountable for its 
role in Mrs. Willemsen’s death and her family would not be compensated for 
their loss. 
While it may be easy to dismiss the CTE example as an unrealistic 
hypothetical because the courts have endorsed the stream-of-commerce theory of 
 
86. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
87. Willemsen, 282 P.3d at 869–70. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 869 (“CTE reasoned that due process would permit an Oregon court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over it only if CTE had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business here. In CTE’s 
view, the fact that it sold its battery chargers to Invacare in Ohio, which sold them together with its wheelchairs 
in Oregon, was not sufficient to meet that standard.”). 
90. Id. at 869–70. 
91. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (articulating the basic test for personal 
jurisdiction: whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”). 
92. Id. 
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personal jurisdiction, articulating a clear test is becoming increasingly important 
as economies become more global.93 For example, in 2011, the United States 
imported $128.8 billion dollars in goods from Japan.94 Vehicles, machinery, and 
electrical devices were the top three import categories, totaling roughly $100 
billion dollars.95 Imagine if Japanese corporations sent all of these goods into 
various states in the United States through distributors or sent pieces of these 
goods to be further assembled and sold by US manufacturers, with no 
instructions on how or where to sell them. Further, imagine that one of these 
products or a component part that came from a Japanese corporation was 
defective and injured an American consumer. Would the consumer be able to 
hale the foreign corporation into court?96 Personal jurisdiction in this hypothetical 
becomes a much tougher question without looking to the stream-of-commerce 
theory.97 
As the global economy continues to grow,98 personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence must expand to ensure consumers have recourse for injuries and 
damage from defective products. That includes articulating a clear, consistent test 
for establishing minimum contacts through the stream-of-commerce for the 
purposes of personal jurisdiction.99 
 
93. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing the global economy). 
94. Japan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-
regions/japan-korea-apec/japan (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
95. Id. 
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) could be an option for establishing jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, but 
does present some issues. First, in order to utilize this rule, the claim must arise under federal law and second, 
as the advisory notes state, “There also may be a further Fifth Amendment constraint in that a plaintiff’s forum 
selection might be so inconvenient to a defendant that it would be a denial of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ 
required by the due process clause . . . .” Id. 
97. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (holding that sufficient minimum contacts did 
not exist between a Delaware trust company and the state of Florida in order for a Florida court to exercise 
jurisdiction). “The defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None of 
the trust assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no solicitation of business 
in that State either in person or by mail. The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done 
or transaction consummated in the forum State.” Id. 
98. See Annie Lowrey, I.M.F. Lowers Its Forecast for Global Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/business/global/imf-lowers-its-global-growth-forecast.html?_r=0 (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting global growth to increase by 3.6 percent in 2013). 
99. See Melissa A. Murphy-Petros, “Stream of Commerce Plus” or Minus? Advancing the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction in Product Liability Cases, WILSON ELSER, http://www.wilsonelser.com/files/repository/ 
PL_PersonalJurisdiction_eNewsApril08.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
[F]or example, the Illinois Appellate Court found that personal jurisdiction over Tokai Corporation in 
Illinois was constitutionally permissible solely because it designed a product in Japan and its U.S. 
subsidiary in California—a separate corporation in whose operations Tokai plays no role—bought the 
design in Japan, had the product manufactured in Mexico by a Mexican corporation, and then 
distributed the product into the national stream of commerce in the United States, from which it 
ultimately came to Illinois. These essential facts are not unique to any particular jurisdiction, and with 
no current national uniform interpretation and application of the stream of commerce theory, some 
federal and state courts would decline personal jurisdiction based on them; others would not.  
Id. 
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B. Nicastro: Where the Court Went Wrong 
This Section critically examines the plurality, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions in Nicastro. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each, 
particularly in light of existing precedent and the goals this Comment sets out to 
accomplish. 
1. Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion 
a. The Law: It’s Not What He Says It Is 
In his Nicastro plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy either distorts or fails to 
mention a handful of well-known personal jurisdiction precedents,100 including: 
the introduction of the stream-of-commerce theory in Gray v. American Radiator 
Standard Sanitary Corp.;101 the Court’s approval of the stream-of-commerce 
theory in World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson;102 and the applicability of the 
“effects test” articulated in Calder v. Jones.103 
The Illinois Supreme Court introduced the stream-of-commerce doctrine in 
1961 in a well-known case taught in most Civil Procedure courses, Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.104 The plaintiff was injured when 
her hot water heater exploded because of a defective safety valve manufactured 
by an out-of-state company.105 The court upheld jurisdiction based upon the 
benefits that the company received from the laws of the state in transacting 
business, despite the fact that there was no information on the volume of sales in 
Illinois106 or whether the defendant had any direct business in Illinois.107 
In 1980, stream-of-commerce jurisprudence continued to develop in World-
Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, when the Court seemingly approved the use 
of the theory as articulated in Gray.108 While the Court found that the use of the 
stream-of-commerce theory to establish personal jurisdiction was not proper 
 
100. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785–91. 
101. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (Ill. 1961). 
102. World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–298 (1980). 
103. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
104. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1961). 
105. Id. at 762. 
106. Id. at 764. 
107. Id. at 766 (“As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in 
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products. 
Advanced means of distribution and other commercial activity have made possible these modern methods of 
doing business, and have largely effaced the economic significance of State lines.”). 
108. See generally 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (considering whether personal jurisdiction over a New York car 
dealer involved in a products liability suit was proper in Oklahoma, the state where the plaintiffs were traveling 
when the car accident in which they were injured occurred).  
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based upon the set of facts presented,109 it did not discount the precedent set by 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray.110 The Court stated: 
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as 
Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from 
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or 
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not 
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly 
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or 
to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due 
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that 
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation 
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.111 
In his Nicastro plurality analysis, which attempts to clarify the stream-of-
commerce doctrine, Justice Kennedy makes no mention of the Gray case, despite 
the fact that the Supreme Court endorsed its holding, and he only discusses a few 
brief points from the World-Wide Volkswagon opinion.112 Although the Court in 
World-Wide Volkswagon says jurisdiction may be proper when a corporation has 
an “expectation” that consumers in the forum state will purchase its goods,113 
Justice Kennedy seemingly distorts this point. He writes that the proper inquiry is 
whether “the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power 
of a sovereign” and that the defendant must target the forum.114 This portrayal of 
personal jurisdiction case law is inaccurate.115 By calling for an “intention to 
submit” to the sovereign, it seemingly makes the defendant’s consent to personal 
jurisdiction a touchstone, when existing precedent makes clear it is not.116 
 
109. Id. at 298 (stating that, while it is foreseeable that some purchasers of automobiles may take them to 
Oklahoma, as the plaintiffs did, that unilateral activity is not enough to subject a foreign defendant to the 
jurisdiction of the state). 
110. Id. at 297–98. 
111. Id. The stream of commerce, however, ends with the consumer and jurisdiction cannot be 
established by the consumer’s unilateral action in taking a product from one state to another. Id. at 298. 
112. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011). Both Gray and World-Wide 
Volkswagon were foundational stream-of-commerce precedents and should have factored into consideration of 
that doctrine. Citron, supra note 41, at 650. 
113. World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 298. 
114. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
115. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (holding that a Florida defendant could be 
subjected to a California court’s jurisdiction because the “effects” of their conduct were felt by the plaintiff in 
the forum state). 
116. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788; Dayton, supra note 16, at 255. 
The Shaffer to Burger King line of cases illustrates that, although the Supreme Court has never 
expressly defined purposeful availment, in recent years it has typically used that term to describe a 
pattern of behavior by a defendant that can objectively be expected to result in contacts between the 
defendant and the state in question. The Court’s decisions indicate that the defendant must undertake 
affirmative acts that ultimately bring him in contact with the state, but they also make clear that 
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A defendant may also be subject to personal jurisdiction in a distant forum 
based upon an “effects” test articulated in Calder v. Jones,117 additional precedent 
that demonstrates that it is not always necessary for an actor to have an intention 
to submit to the power of the forum state or to target the forum state outright.118 In 
Calder, the Court held jurisdiction was proper based on the effects of the Florida 
residents’ conduct in California.119 Based on the facts in that case,120 defendants 
did not meet the high standard set by Justice Kennedy in Nicastro. While the 
defendants focused their efforts and activities on a California resident, nothing 
about their conduct suggested they were targeting the state or intending to 
“submit to the power of a sovereign.”121 Justice Kennedy appears to improperly 
characterize Calder by limiting that holding to intentional torts.122 This is a point 
of law that remains unsettled.123 
Furthermore, in citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court124 Justice 
Kennedy neglects to mention Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion, which 
essentially states that satisfying minimum contacts through the stream of 
commerce is dependent upon “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character 
of the components.”125 Rather, he treats the O’Connor and Brennan opinions as 
 
‘purpose’ does not equal ‘subjective intent,’ that ‘purpose’ has very little to do with ‘control,’ and 
that ‘purposeful’ contacts need not be direct ones. 
Id. 
117. 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
118. Id.  
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 784–85 (explaining that the key facts, in considering whether personal jurisdiction was proper 
in California in a libel case involving a California plaintiff and Florida defendants, were that the magazine in 
question was largely circulated in California, the defendants relied on California sources, and a California 
resident received tortious injury). 
121. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011); Calder, 465 U.S. at 785–88 
(stating that the defendants’ only contacts with California included calling sources located in the state and 
“knowingly” causing the injury to the plaintiff). 
122. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (referring, seemingly, to Calder in stating that a defendant must 
purposefully avail himself or herself “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, though in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant 
might well fall within the State’s authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws.”). 
123. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (citing Calder as supporting the 
proposition that a defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction for conduct purposefully directed towards 
residents of the forum state, as well as the proposition that a higher showing of factors that support the fairness 
of asserting of personal jurisdiction in the forum could mean a lesser showing of minimum contacts is required); 
IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We have observed that under this test 
[Calder] a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who commits an intentional 
tort by certain acts outside the forum which have a particular type of effect upon the plaintiff within the 
forum.”). But see Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Technologies, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(applying the Calder effects test to a copyright infringement claim); Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical 
Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Calder as standing for the proposition 
that “[a] defendant who enters into an obligation which she knows will have effect in the forum state 
purposefully avails herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state”). 
124. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
125. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788–89 (discussing opinions by Justices O’Connor and Brennan in 
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having equal weight and equal support, despite the fact that neither garnered a 
majority.126 Based upon the divergence in the opinions authored by Justices 
O’Connor127 and Brennan,128 Justice Stevens’ opinion appears to be the narrowest 
basis where there is agreement between a majority of the justices and, hence, it 
should be treated as the rule that emerges from the split court. In not citing 
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Asahi, Justice Kennedy ignores a point of law in line 
with past Court precedent, as Justice Stevens’ opinion overlaps with Justice 
Brennan’s, thereby creating a majority.129 
b. What the Kennedy Opinion Would Do to Personal Jurisdiction 
Recalling Karlene Willemsen’s tragic story,130 one can see what could happen 
if the standard for personal jurisdiction involved proving a defendant 
corporation’s intent to “submit to the power of a sovereign.”131 An international 
corporation could take a completely hands-off approach, conducting no activities 
specifically aimed at any state, and just sell, sell, sell through an independent 
subsidiary or distributor.132 CTE, the foreign corporation that made the allegedly 
defective battery that injured Willemsen, appeared to have no contacts 
whatsoever with Oregon, save the sale of its batteries in the state by the 
wheelchair company.133 Under Justice Kennedy’s analysis, CTE would likely not 
be held accountable for its actions and would continue to reap the benefits of US 
sales because there is no evidence the company intended to submit to Oregon’s 
power or that the company treated Oregon as a sales-target.134 While state 
legislatures make policy decisions regarding products liability and the safety of 
its citizens that state courts should apply when possible, Justice Kennedy’s 
 
Asahi, with no mention of any opinion by Justice Stevens); Asahi v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987). 
126. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788–89. 
127. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (stating that simply placing a product into the stream of commerce is not 
enough; rather, the necessary action for the “finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”). 
128. Id. at 122 (stating that awareness that a product will reach the forum state when placed into the 
stream of commerce satisfies the minimum contacts portion of personal jurisdiction analysis). 
129. See McAllister, supra note 35, at 56 (“Although not expressly noted, Stevens effectively presents an 
approach that is consistent with the Court’s prior decisions which state that a totality of the circumstances in 
each case, and not a bright line rule, should be the proper benchmark for determining whether minimum 
contacts exist to support personal jurisdiction.”). 
130. See discussion supra Part I (describing a fire allegedly caused by a defective battery manufactured 
by a foreign corporation). 
131. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
132. See Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The possibility of being 
haled into an Illinois court creates a particularly effective deterrent to the manufacture of unsafe fireworks 
where purchasers of Austin’s fireworks might otherwise be immune from Illinois tort law liability on the basis 
of workers’ compensation statutes, as happened in the present case.”). 
133. Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 869–71 (Or. 2012). 
134. Id. at 871 (stating that CTE did not maintain offices in Oregon or directly sell to, advertise to or 
solicit business from consumers in Oregon); Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
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opinion, picking and choosing between personal jurisdiction precedents,135 
appears to make a real policy choice too: protecting national and international 
corporations over injured citizens.136 
2. Justice Breyer: Ambiguous, but in the Right Direction 
The Oregon Supreme Court wanted to uphold jurisdiction in Willemsen by 
picking up on the theme first articulated by Justice Stevens in Asahi and echoed 
by Justice Breyer in Nicastro: the volume of sales and products that have entered 
the forum matter in the minimum contacts analysis.137 However, Justice Breyer’s 
opinion contains a number of ambiguities. It is impossible to know what would 
have satisfied his minimum contacts standard, as he simply views the record as 
too sparse to support jurisdiction.138 
Justice Breyer also acknowledges jurisdictional concerns surrounding a 
growing global economy.139 In addressing Justice Kennedy’s rigid standards of 
“intend[ing] to submit to the power of the sovereign” and targeting the forum, 
Justice Breyer writes, “But what do those standards mean when a company 
targets the world by selling products from its Web site?”140 That is one of the 
concerns this Comment addresses; however, Justice Breyer leaves the question 
 
135. See supra Part III.B.1.a (discussing which personal jurisdiction precedents Justice Kennedy relied on 
and which he did not). 
136. See J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (“The New Jersey Supreme 
Court also cited ‘significant policy reasons’ to justify its holding, including the State’s ‘strong interest in 
protecting its citizens from defective products.’ That interest is doubtless strong, but the Constitution commands 
restraint before discarding liberty in the name of expediency.”); Willemsen, 282 P.3d at 875 (“If [Kennedy’s] 
opinion were controlling, it might be difficult for plaintiff to show that, on this record, CTE’s contacts with 
Oregon were sufficient to establish jurisdiction over it.”). 
137. Willemsen, 282 P.3d at 877 (“CTE has provided no valid reason to say that the sale of 1,102 CTE 
battery chargers in Oregon over a two-year period does not constitute a ‘regular course of sales’ in this state.”); 
see also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the facts show no 
“regular . . .flow” or “regular course” of sale in New Jersey); Asahi Metal Industry, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 
102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)  
Whether or not this conduct rises to the level of purposeful availment requires a constitutional 
determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the 
components. In most circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing 
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would 
constitute ‘purposeful availment’ even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard 
product marketed throughout the world. 
Id. 
138. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that Nicastro did not introduce any 
evidence to show a specific effort by the corporation to sell in New Jersey, or to show the corporation 
purposefully availed itself of New Jersey laws, or to show that the corporation “delivered its goods in the stream 
of commerce ‘with the expectation they would be purchased’ by New Jersey users”). 
139. Id. at 2793. 
140. Id. 
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open, stating that those types of things (targeting consumers from a Web site) are 
not at issue in the present case—another ambiguity.141 
Furthermore, Justice Breyer also makes clear that he does not agree with a 
strict foreseeability rule, which the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed.142 
Citing concerns about fairness to small manufacturers and the like, Justice Breyer 
does not make clear what type of rule would be workable—choosing, rather, to 
say what would not work.143 
What is clear is that Justice Breyer will not endorse a bright-line, absolute 
rule for personal jurisdiction analysis in cases similar to Nicastro.144 To satisfy 
Justice Breyer and establish a majority approach to stream-of-commerce cases, 
the Court must resolve the ambiguous concerns that have thus far been 
unanswered—like the possibility of subjecting a small-town manufacturer to 
jurisdiction in a distant forum simply because that manufacturer sold its goods to 
a nationwide distributor.145 
3. Justice Ginsberg’s Dissent: Worthy of Consideration 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsberg articulates a number of points 
worthy of consideration when discussing the stream of commerce.146 As is likely 
done by many foreign corporations, Justice Ginsberg points out that McIntyre 
UK engaged a US subsidiary, McIntyre America “as the conduit for sales of 
McIntyre UK’s machines to buyers ‘throughout the United States.’”147 In Justice 
Ginsberg’s view, keeping an eye to the way sales and marketing are typically 
done in today’s global economy, by working through McIntyre America to 
“promote and sell” its products in the United States as a whole, McIntyre UK 
“‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not a 
market in a single State or discrete collection of States.”148 Justice Ginsberg 
recognized that, as international corporations grow and target countries as a 




143. Id. at 2793–94. 
144. Id. (“Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic, manufacturer makes the 
basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more uncertain.”). 
145. Id. at 2793 (“What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or 
expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small 
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large 
distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant state (Hawaii).”). 
146. Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing McIntyre’s connections with the United States as a 
whole as grounds for subjecting the corporation to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey). 
147. Id. at 2797. Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice Breyer mention this point; however, the relationship 
between McIntyre UK and McIntyre America is one that should have been more fully investigated and added to 
the record in support of jurisdiction. 
148. Id. at 2801. 
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corporations will not be able to escape liability simply because they place a 
buffer between themselves and the forum.149 Injured plaintiffs should not be left 
with overseas courts as their only option. 
C.  A Cast for the Fracture: How the Supreme Court Should Rule on the Next 
Stream-of-Commerce Case 
Given the inconsistent and confused rulings emerging from the lower courts 
based on Nicastro,150 as well as the implications surrounding international 
corporations, today’s modern economy, and the stream-of-commerce doctrine,151 
the Court should articulate a clear, meaningful stream-of-commerce test as soon 
as possible. That test should be a continuation of points argued in Justice 
Stevens’ opinion in Asahi and Justice Breyer’s opinion in Nicastro: where a 
sufficient volume of goods enters the forum state through the stream of 
commerce, establishing a regular course of sales, the defendant corporation 
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”152 This is 
consistent with the majority rules that emerge from both Nicastro and Asahi.153 
In applying this test, each set of facts should undergo a case-by-case 
analysis—in order to avoid situations like—as described by Justice Stevens in his 
Nicastro concurrence—the Appalachian potter who sells his goods only to a 
large distributor.154 If it would be inherently unfair to subject a small-time 
manufacturer, like the potter, to jurisdiction in a distant forum, that unfairness 
should be a critical part of the analysis, which, under existing personal 
jurisdiction precedent, involves a balancing of fairness factors articulated in 
Burger King v. Rudzewicz.155 The Appalachian potter hypothetical aside, it is 
 
149. See id. (“McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market. Like most foreign 
manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but rather with 
its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States. As a McIntyre UK officer wrote in an e-mail to McIntyre 
America: ‘American law—who needs it?!’”). 
150. See supra Part II.B (describing the various stream-of-commerce approaches the lower courts have 
 taken since Nicastro). 
151. See supra Part III.A (discussing the growth of the international economy). 
152. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the facts “show no 
‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey”); Asahi Metal Industry, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 
U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (discussing that the volume, 
value, and hazard of goods entering the forum should be considered in a constitutional analysis of whether 
personal jurisdiction is proper); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (stating that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction is not lawful unless a defendant has purposefully availed itself to the laws of the forum 
state). 
153. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment). 
154. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
155. Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (listing fairness factors to include 
“the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
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important to remember that corporations seek to maximize gain and benefit from 
one of the largest economies in the world: the United States.156 These 
considerations should also weigh into a fairness analysis. 
Counsel must also build a complete record when arguing the appropriateness 
of jurisdiction in a particular forum.157 While the Nicastro Court focused heavily 
on the fact that there was only one sale of the machine in question in New 
Jersey,158 McIntyre probably sold more machines than that in the forum—a point 
that could have been supported with a more adequate record.159 In order to meet 
the standard this Comment advocates, a well-built record, particularly one that 
establishes the volume of goods entering the forum, is imperative. 
Utilizing a volume test to establish personal jurisdiction from the stream of 
commerce is also in alignment with existing precedent.160 If a certain volume of 
goods enters a forum, it is not a fortuitous coincidence that would make 
subjecting a defendant corporation to jurisdiction unfair; rather, volume should 
put a potential defendant on notice. Willful blindness in selling through a 
nationwide distributor and asking no question about where the goods are sent 
should not operate to displace this. When a defendant is benefitting from the 
products entering a forum—both from sales of the product and from the laws of 
the forum—the defendant should not be surprised to be subjected to a lawsuit in 
that forum. Essentially, as the Oregon Supreme Court correctly determined in the 
Willemsen case, these things add up to “sufficient minimum contacts” for the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant corporation.161 
Furthermore, as Justice Breyer correctly pointed out in his concurring 
opinion in Nicastro, the cornerstone of the personal jurisdiction inquiry is a focus 
on the “defendant, the forum, and the litigation”—whether “it is fair, in light of 
 
resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies”) (internal quotations omitted). 
156. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing that McIntyre UK earned 
more in the U.S. than it did anywhere else in the world). 
157. See id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing evidence that the plaintiff could have submitted 
to prove jurisdiction, but did not). 
158. Id. at 2790–91; see also id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“None of our precedents finds that a 
single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this 
Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.”). 
159. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that Nicastro could have introduced additional facts in 
support of jurisdiction, such as a list of potential New Jersey customers). 
160. Id. at 2793 (stating that the “constitutional demand” in determining whether jurisdiction is proper is 
“minimum contacts” and “purposeful[l] avail[ment],” both of which “rest upon a particular notion of defendant-
focused fairness”). 
161. Willemsen v. Invacare, 282 P.3d 867, 874–75 (Or. 2012).  
To be sure, nationwide distribution of a foreign manufacturer’s products is not sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction over the manufacturer when that effort results in only a single sale in the forum state. In 
this case, however, the record shows that, over a two-year period, Invacare sold 1,102 motorized 
wheelchairs with CTE battery chargers in Oregon. . . . The sale of the CTE battery charger in Oregon 
that led to the death of the plaintiff’s mother was not an isolated or fortuitous occurrence. 
Id. at 874. 
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the defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit there.”162 
A volume-based, stream-of-commerce test keeps the focus on the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation—requiring a relationship between all three—while still 
allowing for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to evolve with the global 
economy. As consumers become increasingly dependent on online shopping and 
products are shipped to them from all over the world, a rigid standard, such as 
that suggested by Justice Kennedy in his Nicastro plurality opinion, will not 
work.163 
IV. A LEGISLATIVE BACK-UP: CONGRESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
This Part will argue the need for a statutory solution as a stopgap for 
instances where foreign corporations are not subject to jurisdiction in any court 
under a minimum contacts analysis.164 This Part also discusses legislation 
proposed in 2011 that provided a potential solution to this problem and why it did 
not pass then and likely would not pass now. Finally, this Part proposes a new 
statutory solution—an international long-arm statute, where a corporation’s 
contacts are analyzed under Fifth Amendment Due Process, rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Necessity of a Statutory Solution 
A Japanese corporation designs a product and sells the design to its US 
subsidiary in California.165 The subsidiary, an independent corporation not 
controlled by the Japanese corporation in question, then manufactures the 
product in Mexico.166 A Mexican corporation oversees the manufacturing and 
places the product in the stream of commerce, where an Illinois consumer 
purchases it.167 The product has a design defect that injures the consumer and the 
consumer wants to bring a lawsuit against the company who oversaw the 
design—the Japanese corporation.168 Is there a United States court that has 
 
162. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
163. Id. at 2788; see also id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]hat if the company markets its 
products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues have serious 
commercial consequences but are totally absent in this case.”). 
164. See supra Part III.A (describing a hypothetical situation where a foreign defendant would not be 
 subject to personal jurisdiction in any US state). 
165. Saia v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 851 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ill. App. 2006). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. Reasons for suing the Japanese corporation rather than the Mexican corporation can vary, 
although it is a decision that likely comes down to money. For example, in Nicastro, the plaintiff could only 
recover from McIntyre UK because McIntyre America filed for bankruptcy and was no longer operating. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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personal jurisdiction over the Japanese corporation? It is questionable on these 
facts.169 
In the above hypothetical, which was an actual case decided by an Illinois 
court in 2006, the appellate court determined the corporation did have enough 
contacts with the forum to support jurisdiction.170 But in making this 
determination, the court stated:  
“If Scripto [the U.S. subsidiary] succeeds in persuading the trial 
court that it has no responsibility for the negligent design, [the Plaintiff] 
may not have any domestic forum for litigating her negligence claim.  
Illinois has an interest in providing its citizens effective redress for 
negligent design of products distributed here, and Illinois cannot protect 
this interest unless it exercises jurisdiction over foreign designers that use 
subsidiaries to distribute the products they design.”171 
This excerpt effectively describes why a statutory solution is necessary.  
Much like a catchall provision, an international long-arm statute will ensure that 
foreign corporations are subject to jurisdiction in the United States.  Its use 
should be limited to those instances where, under the stream-of-commerce test, a 
foreign corporation remains outside the jurisdiction of any US state.  The statute 
should be drafted as such. This Comment advocates that, in analyzing personal 
jurisdiction for a foreign corporation, courts start with the stream-of-commerce 
theory and utilize the proposed statute as a stopgap. This will create greater 
accountability when businesses seek to sell, as well as greater redress for 
consumers injured by defective products.172 Such a statute is constitutional 
because, under 5th Amendment due process, the inquiry is whether sufficient 
contacts exist with the United States a whole, not with any individual state.173 
B. Dead on Arrival: Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011 
The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (“the Act”) of 2011 
sought to address the issues mentioned in the previous Section.174 As proposed, 
 
169. Murphy-Petros, supra note 99 (stating that “some federal and state courts would decline personal 
jurisdiction” based on the facts stated in this paragraph). 
170. Saia v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 851 N.E.2d at 701. 
171. Id. 
172. See Andrew F. Popper, The Two-Trillion Dollar Carve-Out: Foreign Manufacturers of Defective 
Goods and the Death of H.R. 4678 in the 111th Congress, 26 TOXICS L. REP. 105, 107 (2011) (describing 
various claims against foreign manufacturers and stating “[t]hat foreign entities and individuals profit from the 
sale of goods–on occasion, dangerous or even deadly defective goods–and are somehow outside [the US justice] 
system is offensive, dangerous, and unfair.”) . 
173. Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide Service of Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37, 39 (2008). 
174. Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, S.1946, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (findings 
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the Act required registration of agents of foreign manufacturers authorized to 
accept service of process in the United States; in particular, it required the agent 
to be located “in a State with a substantial connection to the importation, 
distribution, or sale of the covered product.”175 In registering an agent, the foreign 
manufacturer also consented to the personal jurisdiction of the state or federal 
courts where the agent is located.176 The Act only required foreign manufacturers 
who exceeded a minimum volume to appoint an authorized agent.177 
While the Act would have been a large step towards ensuring that foreign 
corporations are not judgment-proof because of personal jurisdiction issues, it did 
not come to fruition, nor does it appear likely to in the future.178 Senate Bill 1946 
and House Bill 3646, both comprising the Act, were reintroductions of earlier, 
similar legislation that did not pass.179 More likely than not, the same issues that 
doomed the 2010 Act also led to the failure of the 2011 Act—“vocal and well-
funded opposition from foreign manufacturers and their U.S. representatives” 
coupled with politicians whose ideologies favor big business.180 
This solution will likely remain unviable so long as staunch partisanship and 
great ideological divide remains in Congress. While the Act is far from perfect—
making no guarantees that an injured plaintiff will be able to litigate in a 
convenient forum181––at the very least, it does bring foreign corporations within 
the reach of the US legal system. It also does so in a way consistent with existing 
legal precedent. One point made by Justice Kennedy in his Nicastro plurality 
opinion is that “explicit consent” by a defendant will support jurisdiction.182 
Agreement to appoint an agent who is authorized to receive service of process, as 
stated in the Act, is viewed as consenting to the jurisdiction of the courts within 
the state where the agent is located.183 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy suggests that 
 
include that “[f]oreign manufacturers and producers often seek to avoid judicial consideration of their actions 
by asserting that United States courts lack personal jurisdiction over them” and “[f]oreign manufacturers and 
producers can avoid the expenses necessary to make their products safe if they know they will not be held liable 
for violations of United States product safety laws”). 
175. Id. § 5. 
176. See id. (clarifying, also, that consent to jurisdiction only applies to regulatory proceedings or civil 
actions relating to the manufactured product). 
177. Id. 
178. S. 1946 (112th): Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1946#related (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (stating both the Senate and House bills that comprised the Act died when the 112th Congress 
adjourned). 
179. Id. 
180. Popper, supra note 172, at 105. 
181. Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, S.1946, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that jurisdiction is proper in the state where the registered agent is 
located, not necessarily the state where the injury occurs). 
182. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011). 
183. Id.; Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, S.1946, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011). 
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a Congressional solution could be the way to go for instances where a foreign 
defendant targets the United States as a whole.184 
Finally, in looking at the fundamental fairness of subjecting a foreign 
manufacturer to jurisdiction within the United States, one only has to consider 
whether that manufacturer is reaping substantial benefits from US consumers, US 
laws, and a distribution network that includes the United States. What seems 
unfair is to subject US manufacturers to this country’s laws and regulations, 
while allowing foreign manufacturers to devise ways to remain outside of the 
system.185 
Because the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act continues to 
fail—despite being a clear, straightforward solution—other legislative options 
should be considered. 
C. An International Long-Arm Statute and Fifth Amendment Due Process 
In exercising personal jurisdiction, both state and federal courts look to the 
long-arm statute in the state where they sit to determine the scope of 
jurisdiction.186 Some long-arm statutes allow the exercise of jurisdiction as far as 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process will allow, which requires an analysis of 
minimum contacts between the forum and defendant.187  This minimum contacts 
analysis is the core of the issue this Comment discusses.188 What if a foreign 
corporation has established no meaningful contacts with any particular state? 
What if the contacts are with the United States as a whole? 
Another statutory possibility exists for situations where a foreign defendant’s 
contacts are with the United States as whole, rather than a particular state. When 
Congress authorizes nationwide service of process, as it has done in bankruptcy 
proceedings, courts look to Fifth Amendment due process analysis: do sufficient 
minimum contacts exist with the United States as a whole?189 Congress should 
enact an international long-arm statute based on diversity jurisdiction (a US 
plaintiff and foreign defendant), narrowly tailored to situations where a 
corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in any state and premised on Fifth 
Amendment due process. The long-arm should explicitly state situations where it 
 
184. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (“It may be that, assuming it were otherwise empowered to legislate on 
the subject, the Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts. That circumstance is 
not presented in this case, however, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address here any constitutional 
concerns that might be attendant to that exercise of power.”). 
185. Popper, supra note 172, at 107. 
186. Gardina, supra note 173, at 37. 
187. See id. (citing Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1995)).“In order to 
obtain personal jurisdiction in diversity action, jurisdiction must be legitimate under laws of forum state and 
under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 
188. See supra Part IV.A (describing instances where a foreign corporation may have no or little 
 minimum contacts with any forum, making the exercise of personal jurisdiction difficult). 
189. Gardina, supra note 173, at 39. 
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is applicable,190 in which federal courts would have jurisdiction over the case 
(should jurisdiction be appropriate), and the applicable law (to prevent choice of 
law issues). This solution is likely more appealing than that proposed in the 
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act because it does not require 
appointment of an agent or consent upfront;191 rather, it calls for minimum 
contacts analysis, which is more in line with existing personal jurisdiction 
precedent.  Furthermore, in considering concerns about damage to businesses, 
this statute should actually be viewed as pro-business: it equalizes the playing 
field for US companies, who are much more likely to be haled into court in the 
United States, and foreign corporations who, depending on how they structure 
their subsidiaries and the like, seemingly enjoy an unfair advantage. 
In Nicastro, there was no denying that McIntyre UK targeted the United 
States as a whole by selling its products to a US distributor.192 The record, as it 
stood, showed no sales by McIntyre UK directly to US consumers nor was there 
any evidence that its US distributor was under its control.193 Analyzing minimum 
contacts for purposes of satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment appears next to 
impossible, but if the same analysis is done under the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, haling McIntyre UK into a US court appears more likely as there 
seems to be no other reason for selling to a US distributor other than to gain 
business from the US as a whole.194 In short, sufficient minimum contacts do 
seem to exist when considering the United States as a whole.195 An international 
long-arm, in still adhering to minimum contacts analysis and fundamental 
fairness, is a reasonable solution to a problem that could otherwise leave 
consumers with no recourse.196 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the modern, global economy grows and more products enter the United 
States from a foreign manufacturer through a distribution chain,197 ensuring that 
these corporations are subject to the personal jurisdiction of a United States court 
is crucial. The Supreme Court should articulate a clear test for determining 
 
190. Applicable situations include products liability claims where a foreign defendant is not subject to 
jurisdiction in any United States court because of lack of minimum contacts. Unlike FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2), the 
claim would not have to be under federal law.  
191. Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, S.1946, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011). 




196. Popper, supra note 172, at 105 (“Because of the complex post-Asahi minimum contacts puzzle, 
many of those producers are not subject to tort liability in state courts regardless of the fact that their products 
are dangerous and likely to be sold in the United States.”). 
197. Id. at 105 (“Gross sales of foreign manufactured goods in the U.S. exceed two trillion dollars 
annually.”). 
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whether personal jurisdiction is proper based on the stream-of-commerce theory 
as soon as possible. Based on existing personal jurisdiction precedent, the test 
should be a volume-based inquiry, examining both the number of products sold 
and the dollar amount of sales within the forum—an analysis some lower courts 
are already applying.198 Furthermore, Congressional action is also necessary to 
prevent foreign corporations with no contacts in any particular forum state from 
being judgment-proof to products liability actions. This stopgap should be an 
international long-arm statute requiring analysis under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment: do sufficient, minimum contacts exist with the United 
States as a whole?199 Foreign corporations should not be able to escape liability 
simply by placing a buffer, such as a US distributor that they do not control, in 
between themselves and the US legal system. 
 
198. See Willemsen v. Invacare, 282 P.3d 867, 874–75 (2012) (determining jurisdiction was proper based 
on the number of products that had entered the forum, as well as the dollar amount sold in the forum). 
199. See supra Part IV.C (suggesting an international long-arm statute where the minimum contacts 
analysis would consider contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than individual states). 
